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ABSTRACT

ACM Reference format:

This paper presents a semantic analysis for mining arguments or
reasoning from the evidence assessment portions (fact-finding
portions) of adjudicatory decisions in law. Specifically, we first
decompose the reasoning into primary branches, using a rule tree
of the substantive issues to be decided. Within each branch, we
further decompose argumentation using two main categories:
reasoning that deploys special legal rules and reasoning that does
not. With respect to special legal rules, we discuss legalpresumption rules, sufficiency-of-evidence rules, and the benefitof-the-doubt rule. Semantic anchors for this decomposition are
provided by identifying the inferential roles of sentences –
principally evidence sentences, finding-of-fact sentences,
evidence-based-reasoning sentences, and legal-rule sentences. We
illustrate our methodology throughout the paper, using data and
examples from a dataset of veterans’ disability claims in the U.S.
for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
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1

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents a semantic analysis for mining arguments or
reasoning patterns from the evidence assessment portions of
adjudicatory decisions in law. By “semantic analysis,” we mean
the process of relating sentences in the text to appropriate
propositions in a pattern of reasoning or argument. By “reasoning”
or “argument,” we mean simply sets of propositions, one of which
(the conclusion) can be reasonably believed to be true if the other
propositions (the premises or conditions) are reasonably believed
to be true [9]. Thus, our approach is compatible with many
proposed frameworks for classifying argument types [14]. By
“evidence assessment” we mean the reasoning of the trier of fact
from the evidence in the legal record to the official findings of
fact in an adjudicatory legal case.
Identifying the inferential roles of sentences within adjudicatory
decisions presents special problems, because sentences in
adjudicatory decisions typically have a wide variety of functions.
These functions include: stating the procedural history of the case;
stating the arguments of different parties on motions, and the
rulings on those motions, and explaining the bases for those
rulings; stating the potentially applicable legal rules, legal policies
and principles, and providing citations to authority; summarizing
the evidence presented and the arguments of the parties for how to
assess the probative value of that evidence, and stating and
explaining the tribunal’s findings of fact; and announcing the final
decision in the case.
Given so many functions of sentences within a decision, it can be
extremely difficult to correctly classify the role of a specific
sentence. For example, a sentence might state (in part) that the
veteran currently has posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but
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that clause might occur in a sentence that states the allegation of
the veteran, the testimony of an expert witness, the content of a
medical record, an applicable legal rule, an event in the procedural
history, a ruling on a motion, or a finding of fact. Moreover, the
decision might be written in such a way that threads of reasoning
or argument overlap. Statements of legal rules might occur within
the context of reporting evidence or reciting the fact-finding
reasoning. Findings of fact might occur within the explanation of
a ruling of law on a motion. In order to extract coherent argument
patterns, we must be able to identify these different sentence roles
and disentangle the overlapping threads of reasoning.
In this paper we report on our empirical investigations into these
issues, using our analysis of a sample of publicly available
decisions that adjudicate claims by military veterans in the United
States for compensation for a service-related disability (“disability
claims”). We focus on claims for posttraumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”).
In Section 2, we briefly discuss prior work, with a focus on
attribution relations and legal discourse models as necessary tools
for mining sentence roles. In Section 3, we briefly discuss the
dataset of veterans’ disability claims. Sections 4-6 describe a
progressive decomposition of the evidence assessment portions of
decisions on such claims. Section 4 discusses generally the
inferential types of sentences frequently found within evidence
assessment, as well as the primary branches of reasoning or
argument within PTSD cases. Section 5 provides examples of
semantic types within evidence assessment when that assessment
deploys special legal rules. Section 6 provides examples of
semantic types for evidence assessment that does not deploy
special legal rules. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude with an
indication of future work.

2

PRIOR RELATED WORK: ARGUMENT
MINING FROM JUDICIAL DECISIONS

This paper draws on many strands of prior work developing
semantic types for mining reasoning or arguments for
computational purposes. [14, 23] The decomposition of evidence
assessment, however, depends upon identifying attribution
relations and employing a legal discourse model, which we now
discuss in more detail.

2.1 Attribution Relations
To identify the inferential roles of sentences and extract coherent
argument patterns from adjudicatory decisions, an important subtask is determining the subject or source to which we should
attribute a stated proposition [17]. Attribution, in the context of
argumentation mining, is the descriptive task of determining
which actor is asserting, assuming or relying upon which
propositions, in the course of presenting reasoning or argument.
Although attribution is a classic problem area in natural language
processing generally [8, 13, 17, 18], there has been limited work
on attribution in respect to argument mining from legal
documents. [11] reported on a project to annotate sentences in
House of Lords judgments for their argumentative roles. Two
tasks were to attribute statements to the Law Lord speaking about
the case or to someone else (attribution), and to classify sentences
as formulating the law objectively vs. assessing the law as
favoring a conclusion or not favoring it (comparison). This work
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extended the work of [19] on attribution in scientific articles.
Unlike the adjudicatory decisions used in our study, the House of
Lords judgments studied by [11] treated facts as already settled in
the lower courts. A broader discussion of attribution within the
context of legal decisions is found in [21].
An example of a sentence explicitly stating an attribution relation
is: The Board finds that the veteran currently has PTSD. As
illustrated in this example, attribution relations have at least
three elements or predicate arguments [17]:
(A) The attribution object: the propositional content of a
sentence that we attribute to some actor or source, expressed
in normal form by an embedded clause (in the example, the
veteran currently has PTSD);
(B) The attribution subject: the actor or source to which we
attribute the propositional content of the sentence (in the
example, the Board); and
(C) The attribution cue: the lexical anchor or cue that signals
the attribution, and which provides us the grounds for making
the attribution (in the example, finds that).
As indicated, an attribution object is a proposition, an attribution
subject is an actor or source, and an attribution cue is a word or
phrase. The attribution cue functions as the linguistic evidence
supporting an attribution relation [25]. The set of all attribution
subjects in the attribution relations found within a text leads
naturally to developing a legal discourse model.

2.2 A Legal Discourse Model
A discourse structure is a semantic representation of certain
linguistic features of a discourse occurring in a text [25]. Such
structures may include the typing of sentences by discourse role
and discourse relations among sentences, as well as classification
of types of discourse structures (such as topic structures,
functional structures, or coherence structures [25]). Discourse
relations can include relations among sentences used to form
arguments [8]. For example, [12] studied discourse relations for
annotating “argument compounds” in technical documents (e.g.,
product manuals). A discourse model is a data structure that a
reader can use to understand the meaning and discourse-relevant
features of the sentences in a document [5]. A discourse model
includes not only information about named actors gleaned from
the document itself, but also presuppositional information about
possible actors and their properties, actions, and relations. This
presuppositional information is the common ground of
background information that is shared among writers and readers
[5]. When attribution problems arise in normal discourse, the
discourse model can assist the reader in making sense of the
sentences of the author.
A legal discourse model is a discourse model that is useful when
interpreting the static legal text as a product of a dynamic process
of discourse [7]. It is a data structure that is shared at least by
attorneys and judges, as well as by other interested participants,
such that the author of a judicial decision can presuppose that an
attorney reading the decision will be familiar with these actors,
and with their properties, actions, and relations, or that it is fair to
assume that the attorney can become familiar with them as the
need arises. For a general discussion of legal discourse models,
see [21].

Semantic Types for Decomposing Evidence Assessment
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A legal discourse model includes: (i) the actors and sources
referred to in the decision (for example, the veteran or the court,
or a medical record or an expert examiner); and (ii) for each such
actor or source, the properties, relations, and other information
that are relevant for some purpose (for example, whether a court is
a trial court or an appellate court, and if an appellate court
whether the rules adopted by it are binding on the tribunal that
issued the decision being analyzed). The discourse model captures
some of the presuppositional information needed to interpret the
reasoning found within a decision, including the actors that are
possible attribution subjects. The information in a legal discourse
model might support, for example, the inference that a legal rule
attributed within the decision to a specific court is therefore a
norm binding on the tribunal issuing the decision, because that
court exercises appellate jurisdiction over the tribunal.

interpretation of a statute or regulation relied upon by the
Veterans Court [1, 16].

3

4 PRIMARY SEMANTIC TYPES FOR
DECOMPOSING EVIDENCE ASSESSMENT

THE DATASET OF PTSD DECISIONS

To investigate useful semantic types for identifying lines of
argument or reasoning within evidence assessment, we analyzed
fact-finding decisions that adjudicate disability claims by veterans
for service-related PTSD. This dataset is being used in the
LUIMA project being conducted by Carnegie Mellon University,
Hofstra University, and the University of Pittsburgh [2, 3, 4, 10,
22]. This section outlines the statutory and regulatory structure,
and the adjudicatory process, for decisions in the PTSD dataset,
and as a by-product suggests part of a legal discourse model for
analyzing the decisions.
Disability benefits for veterans of the United States Uniformed
Services are administered by the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs (“VA”). [1] The appropriate statutes are codified in the
United States Code (e.g., 38 U.S.C., Chapter 11, on compensation
for service-connected disability or death), and the implementing
regulations of the VA are codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations (e.g., 38 C.F.R. Part 3, concerning adjudication).
Individual claims for compensation for a disability usually
originate at a VA Regional Office (“RO”) or at another local
office across the country. [1, 16] If the claimant is dissatisfied
with the decision of the RO, she may file an appeal to the Board
of Veterans’ Appeals (“BVA”). The BVA is an administrative
appellate body that has the statutory authority to decide the facts
of each case de novo. [16] The BVA must provide a written
statement of the reasons or bases for its findings and conclusions,
and that statement “must account for the evidence which [the
BVA] finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, analyze the
credibility and probative value of all material evidence submitted
by and on behalf of a claimant, and provide the reasons for its
rejection of any such evidence.” Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 498,
506 (1995), aff’d, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The disability
caseload of the BVA is heavy – e.g., the BVA issued 55,713
decisions in fiscal year 2015 [16; 6 p. 4], and usually the vast
proportion of appeals (as much as 98%) involve claims for
disability compensation [6 p. 1]. The veterans’ claims dataset
discussed in this paper contains annotated decisions of the BVA.
The veteran may appeal the BVA’s decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims (the “Veterans Court”). [16] Either
the claimant or the VA may appeal a Veterans Court decision to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and from that
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Federal Circuit may only
review questions of law, such as a constitutional challenge, or the

Given this legal framework, sentences in BVA decisions that state
legal rules binding on the BVA often contain attributions to the
United States Code, the Code of Federal Regulations, the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or to
precedential decisions of the Veterans Court (that court also issues
non-precedential decisions). Frequently, an attribution cue is a
citation (within the same sentence or in the immediately following
sentence) to the appropriate reporter (e.g., U.S.C., C.F.R.,
Fed.Cir.). Thus, attribution cues, together with a legal discourse
model containing the appropriate rule-making actors, frequently
help identify sentences that primarily state legal rules binding on
the BVA.

This section of the paper discusses important semantic types for
sentences found within the evidence assessment portions of BVA
decisions, based on the sentence’s inferential role. These sentence
types then provide the anchors for mining the reasoning and
arguments from the decision. The section also discusses findingof-fact sentences as primary anchors for decomposing evidence
assessment into component branches of reasoning.
For purposes of argument mining, evidence assessment generally
contains three functional parts: the conclusion (a finding of fact
on a rule condition); the foundations for the reasoning (the
evidence in the legal record, such as the testimony of a lay
witness, the opinion of an expert witness, or exhibits such as a
medical record, a photo, or a published scientific study); and the
reasoning from the foundations to the conclusion. Performing a
semantic analysis that decomposes evidence assessment into its
component arguments requires identifying the inferential roles of
sentences within this general framework.

4.1 Sentence Types Common within Evidence
Assessment
We classify sentence roles in a BVA decision using the ten
semantic types listed in Table 1. [23] For each of these semantic
types, we develop protocols (providing criteria and methods) for
identifying and annotating each type of sentence. We use such
protocols to train annotators, to review the accuracy of
annotations, and to guide the development of software
programming for automating the annotation process. [23] This
section discusses in more detail four sentence types commonly
found in the fact-finding portions of BVA decisions: evidence
sentences, finding-of-fact sentences, evidence-based reasoning
sentences, and legal-rule sentences.
4.1.1 Evidence Sentence or Clause. An “evidence sentence” is a
sentence that primarily states the content of the testimony of a
witness, states the content of documents introduced into evidence,
or describes other evidence. Evidence sentences provide
foundations for findings of fact. An example of a statement of
evidence is: “The examiner who conducted the February 2008 VA
mental disorders examination opined that the Veteran clearly had
a preexisting psychiatric disability when he entered service.”
[BVA #1303141] Note the function of attribution in assigning an
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evidence-stating role to this sentence: opined that is the attribution
cue, with the examiner who conducted the February 2008 VA
mental disorders examination being the attribution subject. Often,
however, there is no attribution cue internal to an evidence
sentence, but the attribution is based on the context in which the
sentence appears (e.g., within a paragraph devoted entirely to
recounting the testimony of a specific witness).

Table 1. Ten Semantic Types of Sentence or Clause Found in
Judicial Decisions, Based on Reasoning Roles [23]
i.

Citation sentence or clause

ii.

Legal-rule sentence or clause

iii.

Legal-policy sentence or clause

iv.

Policy-based-reasoning sentence or clause

v.

Ruling or holding sentence or clause

vi.

Rule-based-reasoning sentence or clause

vii.

Evidence sentence or clause

viii.

Finding-of-fact sentence or clause

ix.

Evidence-based-reasoning sentence or clause

x.

Procedural-fact sentence or clause

4.1.2 Finding-of-Fact Sentence or Clause. A “finding-of-fact
sentence” (also “evidence-based-finding sentence,” or simply
“finding sentence”) is a sentence that primarily states an
authoritative finding, conclusion or determination of the trier of
fact. An example is: “The most probative evidence fails to link the
Veteran's claimed acquired psychiatric disorder, including PTSD,
to active service or to his service-connected residuals of
frostbite.” [BVA #1340434] This sentence provides an attribution
cue (the most probative evidence fails to) that signals that it is a
conclusion of the fact finder, and the result of weighing the
probative value of the evidence. Although it does not explicitly
mention the attribution source, we can infer from the cue and
context that it is the Board. Other finding sentences are more
explicit in their attribution – e.g., “The Board finds that the
occurrence of the Veteran’s in-service stressor events is credibly
supported in the record.” [BVA #1514581]
4.1.3 Evidence-Based-Reasoning Sentence or Clause. An
“evidence-based-reasoning sentence” is a sentence that primarily
reports the trier of fact’s reasoning in making the findings of fact.
Such reasoning normally involves an assessment of the credibility
and probative value of the evidence, and may also include
application of substantive or process rules, and occasionally even
legal policies. An example is: “Also, the clinician’s etiological
opinions are credible based on their internal consistency and her
duty to provide truthful opinions.” [BVA #1340434] More
examples are provided in sections 5 and 6.
4.1.4 Legal-Rule Sentence or Clause. A “legal-rule sentence” is
a sentence that primarily states one or more legal rules in the
abstract, without stating whether the conditions of the rule(s) are
satisfied in the case being decided. Legal rules provide important
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building blocks for arguments about the issues of fact to be
decided by the fact finder. As we will discuss in Section 5, they
provide structure and elements for evidence-based reasoning. An
example of a BVA sentence stating a legal rule is the first
sentence in the following quotation:
Generally, service connection requires (1) medical evidence
of a current disability, (2) medical evidence, or in certain
circumstances lay testimony, of in-service incurrence or
aggravation of an injury or disease, and (3) medical
evidence of a nexus between the current disability and the inservice disease or injury. See Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d
1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Hickson v. West, 12
Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); accord Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.
App. 498 (1995).
[BVA #1302554] Notice that the trailing citation sentence
provides an attribution cue that this rule originated with the
Federal Circuit as its subject or source, also with earlier decisions
by the Veterans Court.

4.2 Finding-of-Fact Sentences as Primary
Anchors within Evidence Assessment
The governing substantive legal rules provide the means of
decomposing the evidence assessment of a decision. Those rules
state the conditions under which the BVA is required to order
compensation, or is prohibited from ordering compensation. A
legal rule can be represented as a set of propositions, one of which
is the conclusion and the remaining propositions being the rule
conditions [22, 15]. We represent a legal rule by placing the
conclusion at the top of an indented list of its conditions, with
each condition preceded by a symbol for the logical connective
operating between it and the conclusion [23]. Each condition can
function in turn as a conclusion, with its own conditions listed
below it. The resulting nested sets of conditions has a tree
structure – with the entire representation of the applicable legal
rules being called a “rule tree” [22]. Figure 1 presents a partial
rule tree that lists the primary rule conditions for proving that a
veteran claimant has PTSD that is “service-connected” – i.e.,
causally connected to a stressor (dangerous or traumatic event)
that occurred during active service. In terms of logical connectives,
Figure 1 shows that a claimant can prove (and must prove) a
service-connected disability by proving all of three primary
conditions (those preceded by the symbol for a necessary conjunct,
“&n”). Moreover, if that disability happens to be PTSD, then
there are specific conditions (preceded by the symbol for
disjunction, “V”) for proving each of these three primary
conditions. As a result, in a BVA decision on a disability claim for
PTSD, we expect the fact-finding reasoning to be organized
around arguments and reasoning on these three PTSD rule
conditions, and we use findings of fact on these three conditions
to anchor our decomposition of the evidence assessment text.
In general, a rule tree integrates all the relevant rules from
statutes, regulations, and case law into a single, computable
system of legal rules. The main branches of the tree identify all
the primary issues of fact (primary propositions to be decided) for
deciding a disability claim. A BVA decision supplies the findings
of fact on these rule conditions, in determining whether enough of
them are satisfied in the specific case so that the veteran claimant
is entitled to compensation. Thus, in analyzing the evidence
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assessment portion of a BVA disability decision, we first create
semantic types for findings of fact under each of the three primary
issues.
The veteran has a disability that is “service-connected.”
&n [1 of 3] The veteran has “a present disability.”
V [1 of …] The veteran has “a present disability” of
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), supported by
“medical evidence diagnosing the condition in
accordance with [38 C.F.R.] § 4.125(a).”
V [2 of …] …
&n [2 of 3] The veteran incurred “a particular injury or
disease … coincident with service in the Armed Forces, or if
preexisting such service, [it] was aggravated therein.”
V [1 of …] The veteran’s disability claim is for
service connection of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), and there is “credible supporting evidence that
the claimed in-service stressor occurred.”
V [2 of …] …
&n [3 of 3] There is “a causal relationship [“nexus”]
between the present disability and the disease or injury
incurred or aggravated during service.”
V [1 of …] The veteran’s disability claim is for
service connection of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), and there is “a link, established by medical
evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service
stressor.”
V [2 of …] …
Figure 1. Partial Rule Tree (List of Legal Rule Conditions) for
Proving That a Veteran Has a Service-Connected Disability,
and Specifically PTSD (Citations Omitted).
There are important heuristics in identifying the appropriate
finding-of-fact sentences. First, the rule tree shown in Figure 1
shows that in order to find for the veteran, the BVA must make
positive findings of fact on all three prongs of the Shedden rule
(also formulated in the quotation in Section 4.1.4 above). As a
corollary, in order to deny the veteran’s claim, the BVA must
make a negative finding of fact on at least one of those three
prongs. In a sample of 20 representative BVA decisions involving
a claim of PTSD, we investigated the frequency of findings on the
three Shedden prongs, with the results shown in Table 2. The
entries in Table 2 suggest how difficult the search for these
findings can be. The cases sometimes make findings on
“psychiatric disability including PTSD,” and sometimes make
separate findings for PTSD and for “psychiatric disability other
than PTSD.” Moreover, when a claim is denied, a decision can
present a variety of patterns with respect to the three Shedden
prongs. For example, there might be one, two or three negative
findings, involving a variety of the three prongs; some prongs
might have no finding at all. Finally, particularly in cases where
the claim is denied, some findings might be implicit in the text or
assumed for purposes of adjudication (for example, in assuming a
present diagnosis of PTSD arguendo, and then focusing the
discussion on a negative finding for Prong 2, the occurrence of an
in-service stressor).
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A difficulty is that a finding of fact might well employ much of
the same wording as a statement of the rule itself, or as a ruling or
holding employing the rule, so finding-of-fact sentences must be
distinguished from legal-rule sentences. Confusion between these
types of sentences must be kept acceptably low.

5 DECOMPOSING EVIDENCE
ASSESSMENTS THAT DEPLOY SPECIAL
LEGAL RULES
In decomposing evidence assessment beyond the three primary
findings of fact discussed in Section 4.2, we have found it useful
to distinguish assessments that are organized around special types
of legal rules from assessments that are not. This section discusses
semantic types within that first category – and specifically those
assessments that deploy legal-presumption rules, sufficiency-ofevidence rules, and the benefit-of-the-doubt rule. Section 6
discusses the decomposition of evidence assessment when it does
not deploy such legal rules.

5.1 Legal-Presumption Rules
5.1.1
Legal-Presumption Rules Defined. A legal rule might
establish a “presumption” – that is, a conditional rule with a
defeater, of the general form: if proposition p (the “basic fact” or
“triggering condition”) is true, then proposition q is presumed to
be true (the “presumed fact”), unless proposition r is true (the
“defeater proposition”). [20] A legal presumption important in
proving Shedden Prong 2 is the “presumption of soundness,”
which derives from the following statutory provision, 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 1111 (2017):
[E]very veteran shall be taken to have been in sound
condition when examined, accepted, and enrolled for service,
except as to defects, infirmities, or disorders noted at the
time of the examination, acceptance, and enrollment, or
where clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that
the injury or disease existed before acceptance and
enrollment and was not aggravated by such service.
The triggering condition for the presumption is that a disease or
injury manifests in service, and a question arises as to whether it
preexisted service. In such a situation, if the disease or injury was
not noted upon entry to service, then the presumption of
soundness applies. Gilbert v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 48, 55 (CAVC
2012), aff’d, 749 F.3d 1370 (Fed.Cir. 2014). There is one
defeating condition, however: if the VA proves “by clear and
unmistakable evidence that a disease or injury manifesting in
service both preexisted service and was not aggravated by
service.” Id. Thus, the case law interprets the statutory
presumption as shifting the burden of proof to the VA, and
imposing on the VA a high standard of proof and sufficiency of
evidence (“clear and unmistakable evidence”).
If the presumption of soundness is triggered and the burden of
proving the defeater shifts to the VA, then the agency has to prove
two conditions in order to rebut the presumption: (a) that “the
injury or disease existed before acceptance and enrollment,” and
(b) that “the injury or disease … was not aggravated by such
service.” The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, in Horn v.
Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 231, 235 (CAVC 2012), elaborated that the
VA may prove the second condition “by establishing, with clear
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and unmistakable evidence, that there was no increase in disability
during service or that any ‘increase in disability [was] due to the
natural progress’ of the preexisting condition.” Because the court
in Horn uses the verb “may prove,” it is not explicit whether there
could be a third alternative way of proving aggravation, so on this
text we interpret these as merely alternative methods within an
incomplete set.

because the presumption is merely one alternative method of
proving Shedden Prong 2.
5.1.2
Example: BVA #1525217. In that case, the veteran
claimed a service connection for a psychiatric condition, to
include PTSD. The Board ruled in the veteran’s favor on the claim
as a whole. In reaching that outcome, the Board made an explicit
positive finding with respect to Shedden Prong 2:

These elaborated legal rules are represented in the partial rule tree
shown in Figure 2. We attach the rules for the presumption of
soundness to Shedden Prong 2 using the weak disjunctive “V”

Next, the evidence of record makes at least equally likely that
the Veteran manifested symptoms of his condition during

Table 2. Findings of Fact on the Three Shedden Prongs in a Sample of BVA PTSD Disability Decisions. Possible Values = Positive
Finding (for the Veteran); Negative Finding (against the Veteran); No Finding. A value entered in parentheses indicates that the
value is implicit or assumed for purposes of adjudication, or that the basis for the value is uncertain.
Shedden Prong 1
Shedden Prong 2
Shedden Prong 3
BVA Citation Number Ultimate Finding
(Present PTSD)
(In-Service Stressor)
(Causal Link)
1302554

Denied

(Negative Finding)

Negative Finding

(Negative Finding)

1303141

Denied

PTSD*– Neg. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Positive
Finding

PTSD*– No Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding

PTSD*– No Finding
Psych.Dis.*- No Finding

1315144

Denied

1316146

Denied

1316336

Denied

1334312

Denied

(Positive Finding)
PTSD*– Neg. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Positive
Finding
PTSD*– Neg. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Positive
Finding
(Positive Finding)

Negative Finding
PTSD*– Neg. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding
PTSD*– No Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding
Negative Finding

Negative Finding
PTSD*– Neg. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding
PTSD*– No Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding
No Finding

1343153

Denied

PTSD*– Pos. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Positive
Finding

PTSD*– Pos. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding

PTSD*– Neg. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding

1400029

Denied

Negative Finding

Positive Finding

No Finding

PTSD*– No Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding
Negative Finding

PTSD*– No Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding
No Finding

No Finding

No Finding

1413417

Denied

1431031

Denied

PTSD*– Neg. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- (Positive
Finding)
(Positive Finding)

1445540

Remanded

No Finding

1455333

Granted

Positive Finding

Positive Finding

Positive Finding

1505726

Denied

Negative Finding

Negative Finding

(Negative Finding)

1514581

Denied

Positive Finding

Positive Finding

Negative Finding

1525217

Granted

Positive Finding

Positive Finding

Positive Finding

1526599

Denied

Negative Finding

No Finding

No Finding

1608262

Denied

Negative Finding

No Finding

No Finding

1613894

Denied

1630016

Granted

PTSD*– (Pos. Finding)
Psych.Dis.*- Positive
Finding
(Positive Finding)

PTSD*– Neg. Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding
Positive Finding

PTSD*– No Finding
Psych.Dis.*- Negative
Finding
Positive Finding

1630402

Granted

Positive Finding

Positive Finding

Positive Finding

* This decision provided distinct findings for PTSD and for a psychiatric disability other than PTSD.
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service. … Because the Veteran is presumed sound at service
entrance, and because the presumption of soundness is not
rebutted, the psychiatric condition that manifested in service
is deemed service-incurred.
What occurs within the space of the ellipsis in the above quotation
is the Board’s recitation of the relevant evidence and the
application of the complex set of rules about the presumption of
soundness (see Sub-section 5.1.1).
The veteran has a disability that is “service-connected.”
&n [1 of 3] …
&n [2 of 3] The veteran incurred “a particular injury or
disease … coincident with service in the Armed Forces, or if
preexisting such service, [it] was aggravated therein.”
V [1 of …] The presumption of soundness is
established and unrebutted.
&n [1 of 2] An injury or disease manifested in
service.
&n [2 of 2] The injury or disease was not “noted at
the time of the examination, acceptance, and
enrollment.”
REBUT The VA proves by “clear and
unmistakable evidence … that the injury or disease
existed before acceptance and enrollment and was
not aggravated by such service.”
&n [1 of 2] The VA proves by “clear and
unmistakable evidence … that the injury or
disease existed before acceptance and
enrollment.”
&n [2 of 2] The VA proves by “clear and
unmistakable evidence … that the injury or
disease … was not aggravated by such
service.”
V [1 of 2] The VA proves by “clear and
unmistakable evidence” … that “there
was no increase in disability during
service.”
V [2 of 2] The VA proves by “clear and
unmistakable evidence” … that “any
‘increase in disability [was] due to the
natural progress’ of the preexisting
condition.”
V [2 of … ] …
&n [3 of 3] …
Figure 2. Partial Rule Tree (List of Legal Rule Conditions) for
Using the Presumption of Soundness to Prove Shedden Prong
2 (In-service Incurrence or Aggravation) (Citations Omitted).
The first necessary condition for establishing the presumption of
soundness is that an injury or illness manifested in service (see
Figure 2). The Board examined a service treatment record (STR)
from December 1983 (the veteran served on active duty from May
1981 to May 1985). The Board concluded that “the December
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1983 treatment for depression establishes (a) treatment for a
mental health condition during service (depression), and (b) a
stressful event (the impending death of his father).”
The second necessary condition for establishing the presumption
of soundness is that the injury or disease was not noted at the time
of examination, acceptance, and enrollment (see Figure 2). On the
basis of a physical examination at entrance in May 1981, the
Board concluded that “[f]or purposes of this appeal, a mental
health condition was not ‘noted’ at service entrance.”
Given findings on these two conditions, the presumption of
soundness was triggered, and the burden is shifted to the VA to
prove the defeater proposition by “clear and unmistakable
evidence” (see Figure 2).
The first necessary condition that the VA must prove is that the
veteran’s depression (the disease that manifested during service)
existed before acceptance and enrollment into active service (see
Figure 2). Ultimately, the Board concluded that “[t]here is not
clear and unmistakable evidence establishing the preexistence of a
psychiatric condition.” The Board provided various supporting
reasons for this finding, including that there was no
contemporaneous evidence prior to service, and that “there is only
circumstantial evidence indicating a preexisting psychiatric
condition” (providing examples of such circumstantial evidence).
We have in this decision some indication of how to argue that
such evidence is “circumstantial,” and therefore not “clear and
unmistakable.”
Even assuming arguendo that the veteran’s depression preexisted
service, the second necessary condition that the VA must prove to
rebut the triggered presumption of soundness is that it was not
aggravated during service. The Board concluded that “[t]here is
also no clear and unmistakable evidence establishing that his
psychiatric condition, if preexisting, was not aggravated during
service.” In order to reach this finding, the Board needed to (and
did) discount as not “clear and unmistakable evidence” a record of
a September 2011 VA examination that seemingly explicitly
found the contrary (“NOT aggravated beyond natural
progression,” emphasis in original). Ambiguities in the report
undermined its probative value, as well as the examiner’s use of
the qualifiers “tends” and “contraindicate,” which “suggest that
this conclusion was not undebatable.”
The Board therefore found that the VA had failed to rebut the
triggered presumption of soundness, and that the veteran had
therefore satisfied Shedden Prong 2. We discuss this example in
detail here to illustrate how legal-presumption rules can structure
the assessment of the evidence.

5.2 Sufficiency-of-Evidence Rules
5.2.1
Sufficiency-of-Evidence
Rules
Defined.
“Legal
sufficiency of the evidence” (or simply “legal sufficiency” or
“sufficient evidence”) is a fundamental concept in US
jurisprudence related to adjudication, whether by courts or by
administrative tribunals. Such rules may be established by statute,
or by regulation, or by appellate case law. These rules are
intended to advance the rule of law by imposing a minimum
standard on the types of evidence that could reasonably support a
finding of fact in a case. An important example for veterans’
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claims is provided by the regulations in 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f),
which provide rules for whether or under what conditions “the
veteran’s lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the
claimed in-service stressor.” These specific regulations are
triggered only if there was a diagnosis of PTSD during service (§
3.304(f)(1)), the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy (§
3.304(f)(2)), the claimed stressor is related to the veteran’s fear of
hostile military or terrorist activity (§ 3.304(f)(3)), the veteran was
a prisoner-of-war (§ 3.304(f)(4)), or the claim is based on inservice personal assault (§ 3.304(f)(5)).
5.2.2
Example: BVA #1334312. In that case, the veteran
claimed a service connection for various disabilities, including
“an acquired psychiatric disability, to include … PTSD.” The
Board denied the claim. The Board made an explicit negative
finding with respect to Shedden Prong 2:
As to the PTSD issue specifically, the Veteran’s own reports,
which is [sic] the only evidence favorable to his claim of
entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability,
are not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of credible
supporting evidence of the occurrence of any reported inservice stressor.
The Board found that none of the special provisions in 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.304(f) applied in that case. Then, citing Cohen v. Brown, 10
Vet.App. 128, 145 (1997), the Board stated:
In cases such as this, credible supporting evidence of the
occurrence of the stressor must be provided by someone
other than the Veteran and cannot be provided solely by after
the fact medical nexus evidence.
Because there was no additional evidence satisfying this rule, the
Board ruled that it “must deny the appeal as to entitlement to
service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include …
PTSD.” Under the legal rules as the Board understood them, it
had no discretion to weigh the evidence relevant to the occurrence
of an in-service stressor, because there was insufficient evidence
to support such fact-finding, as a matter of law.

5.3 The Benefit-of-the-Doubt Rule
5.3.1
Benefit-of-the-Doubt Rule Defined. Normally, in US
law, the burden of proof (the “risk of nonpersuasion”) is on the
plaintiff, petitioner or claimant – the party seeking to prove that it
is entitled to compensation. In cases governed by the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof, this means that
as a matter of law an issue of fact must be decided against the
plaintiff, petitioner or claimant if the evidence is in equipoise. The
statute governing veterans claims, however, reverses this normal
burden of proof, and places the burden of persuasion on the VA:
“When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative
evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a
matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of
the doubt to the claimant.” 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (2017); see 38
C.F.R. § 3.102 (2017); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364-66
(Fed.Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 55 (1990).
5.3.2
Example: BVA 1525217. In that case, the Board
explicitly used the benefit-of-the-doubt rule, first in respect to
individual factual issues and then in respect to the set of issues as
whole, ultimately finding as follows:
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For these reasons, after resolving all reasonable doubt in the
Veteran's favor, the evidentiary record is in relative
equipoise as to all material elements of the claim. Therefore,
service connection is warranted for a psychiatric disability,
variously diagnosed as schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
disorder, and PTSD, and the claim must be granted.
In applying the benefit-of-the-doubt rule, the Board was
constrained to find for the veteran on the evidence of record.

6 DECOMPOSING EVIDENCE
ASSESSMENTS THAT DO NOT DEPLOY
SPECIAL LEGAL RULES
This section discusses several patterns of evidence assessment that
do not deploy legal rules such as legal-presumption rules,
sufficiency-of-evidence rules, or the benefit-of-the-doubt rule.
When such rules do not determine the outcome of the fact-finding,
the fact finder has discretion to assess the probative value of the
evidence. For purposes of decomposing argumentation, therefore,
we must look for patterns of evidence assessment that we find
employed by the Board when it is exercising its fact-finding
discretion. This section discusses several such patterns.
In deciding an issue as a matter of fact, the Board must consider
“all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a
case.” 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (2017). The Board must weigh the
probative value of all “competent” evidence that is in the
evidentiary record and is relevant to that issue. A lay witness, for
example, is competent to testify only to that which she has
“actually observed,” and of which she has “personal knowledge”;
“[g]enerally, lay testimony is not competent to prove that which
would require specialized knowledge or training.” Layno v.
Brown, 6 Vet.App. 465, 469-70 (1994). For example, the Board
might rule that the Veteran “has not shown that he is competent to
render” an opinion as to whether “his psychiatric disability is
related to service,” because “it is a matter of complexity that
requires specialized knowledge which the Veteran has not been
shown to possess.” [BVA 1316336] Whether testimony is
competent and thus “may be heard and considered by the trier of
fact” is a question of law, whereas determining the weight and
credibility of that testimony is a question of fact going to the
probative value of the evidence. Layno, 6 Vet.App. at 469.

6.1 Probative-Value Factors for Types of
Evidence Source
6.1.1
Probative-Value Factors Defined. We are finding that
patterns emerge in the cases concerning the factors that are
relevant in assessing the probative value of each type of evidence
source. Sometimes a statute or regulation, or appellate case law,
may determine that a list of factors is relevant to a specific issue.
For example, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has stated
that it is “the factually accurate, fully articulated, sound reasoning
for the conclusion, not the mere fact that the claims file was
reviewed, that contributes the probative value to a medical
opinion.” Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 295, 304
(2008). Otherwise, fact finders themselves can evolve sets of
factors that are predictive of patterns of evidence assessment in
similar circumstances.
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Our working hypothesis is that, for any specific type of evidence
source that is typically found in veterans claims cases, there is a
list of factors that the Board typically employs in determining
both the “credibility” and the degree of probative value of the
evidence. At a minimum, the evidence must be “credible”
(“worthy of belief” or “trustworthy”), and a testifying witness
must be “credible” (i.e., her testimony must be “believable”)
(Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed., 2014). Beyond mere
credibility, the probative value of a specific item of evidence is
sometimes also assessed in isolation from other evidence, using a
list of relevant factors.
6.1.2
Example: BVA 1316336. In that case, the Veteran
claimed entitlement to a determination of service connection for a
psychiatric disability, to include PTSD. The Board denied the
claim. With regard to PTSD specifically, the Board made a
negative finding on Shedden Prong 1 (“the Board finds the
Veteran does not have PTSD”), so made no findings on the other
two prongs (see Table 2). With regard to “a psychiatric disability
other than PTSD,” the Board found adequate evidence for such a
disorder (Shedden Prong 1), but found against the veteran on
Prongs 2 and 3. In the Board’s reasoning supporting the negative
finding on Prong 2, we find discussion of various relevant factors.
With respect to the veteran’s own reports concerning traumatic inservice events (witnessing a helicopter crash involving casualties,
witnessing public executions or mutilations while in Kuwait City,
experiencing military sexual trauma), the Board discounted the
testimony based on the following factors. First, the veteran’s
various reports over the years contained inconsistent details about
events, including his reports about his involvement with the
helicopter crash, his reports about the military sexual trauma, and
his reports about the date of onset of his psychiatric symptoms.
Second, the veteran’s reports of in-service psychiatric symptoms
were not corroborated by his service medical or personnel records.
Third, there were in the record “highly probative medical findings
of over-endorsement of symptomatology” (the numerous postservice examination records began to record concern that the
veteran had “a long history of over-reporting symptoms”). The
veteran’s reports were often contained in post-service treatment
records, created at the time of seeking treatment, or in VA
examination records. Taking these factors into account, the Board
found that the veteran’s reports of in-service symptoms, while
competent on the issue, were “not probative evidence” of either an
in-service onset or in-service aggravation of a psychiatric
disability.
6.1.3
BVA 1630016. In that case, the veteran alleged a service
connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder to include PTSD.
Unlike the result in BVA 1316336, discussed in Section 6.1.2
above, the Board here made a positive finding on Shedden Prong
2, based in part on the veteran’s own testimony and prior reports
in the post-service medical history. Ultimately, the Board
concluded that a “service connection for PTSD with depression is
warranted.” As to consistency within the veteran’s own reports,
the Board noted as part of the basis for its decision the veteran’s
“credible assertions,” reasoning that “[t]he Veteran has
consistently reported that he was sexually assaulted by two
servicemen during service in July 1976.” Although the veteran’s
service treatment records were “negative for treatment of, or a
diagnosis of any acquired psychiatric disorder,” the Board
reasoned that “the Veteran’s stressor is not the type of situation
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that would be documented in the official record (he was sexually
assaulted and threatened by his superior not to tell anyone about
it).”
Moreover, the lay statement of a longtime friend of the veteran
provided an “eyewitness account of a drastic change in the
Veteran’s behavior before service compared to his behavior after
service.” Finally, the finding was “supported by two competent
medical opinions,” one by a VA examiner in July 2013 and the
other by the veteran’s Vet Center counselor in November 2014.
The Board cited the Federal Circuit in Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638
F.3d 1379 (Fed.Cir. 2011) for the legal rule that a medical opinion
based on a post-service examination may be used to corroborate
the occurrence of an in-service stressor. The Board summarized:
In summary, the most probative evidence of record supports
a finding that the Veteran’s PTSD and major depression
resulted from an in-service stressor. This is supported by a
two [sic] competent medical opinions, and the eyewitness
account of a drastic change in the Veteran’s behavior before
service compared to his behavior after service and the
Veteran’s credible assertions.

6.2 Comparative Assessment Patterns for
Pairings of Evidence Sources
6.2.1
Comparative Assessment Defined. “Preponderance of
the evidence” is the standard of proof used by the Board in
deciding factual issues in veterans’ claims cases (see Section 5.3
above). The preponderance standard of proof has led to patterns of
comparative evidence assessment in BVA decisions. The heuristic
of the Board often is to compare the probative value of two items
of evidence that are directly conflicting with each other, and to
determine by various relevant factors which item of evidence
“weighs more” (has more probative force) than the other one. We
also look for patterns where the Board (or a court) explicitly states
that a certain type of evidence tends to have greater probative
value than another type of evidence.
6.2.2
Example: BVA 1505726. In that case, the veteran
claimed a service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder,
to include PTSD, based on alleged military sexual trauma. In
denying the claim, the Board provided the following explanation:
Overall, the September 2013 VA psychiatric examination in
particular was very thorough, supported by explanations,
and considered the Veteran’s history and relevant
longitudinal complaints. It also considered the lay and buddy
statements of record. This VA opinion, supported also by the
other evidence listed above, outweighs the findings of the
April 2013 private psychological evaluation on the issue of
whether the Veteran has a PTSD diagnosis in accordance
with DSM-IV from alleged sexual assaults.
The first sentence of this quotation also contributes several factors
as considered relevant in assessing the probative value of a
psychiatric examination.
6.2.3
Example: BVA 1302554. In denying a claim for an
acquired psychiatric disorder, including PTSD, the Board
reasoned:
The Board is of the opinion that the contemporaneous
treatment records during service have the greatest probative
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value as to the Veteran’s mental status at that time. This is
particularly true when weighed against lay statements such
as those given by the Veteran or in various written
statements from persons who knew him during and after
service.
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[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]

Such a comparison of contemporaneous records with later reports
or testimony is a recurring pattern within BVA cases.

7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a methodology for conducting a semantic
analysis of the evidence assessment portions (fact-finding
portions) of adjudicatory decisions, providing examples
throughout the paper drawn from our analysis of decisions on
veterans’ disability claims. We use a substantive rule tree to
decompose issues of fact into sub-issues, and use protocols to
identify the finding-of-fact sentences under each sub-issue (rule
condition). Within those substantive branches of reasoning, we
further decompose evidence assessment using special legal rules
and recurring probative-value factors.
This methodology requires continuing work in several directions.
First, we are in the process of making the veterans’ claims dataset
publicly available [23], and we will continue to add annotated
decisions to that dataset. Collective scrutiny of the wide diversity
of expression in such documents is the only way to ensure that we
are employing adequate semantic types and doing so correctly.
Second, we will continue to elaborate our protocols for manually
annotating those documents, to ensure consistency and accuracy
of the annotations, and to provide suggestions for developing
software to automatically assist in the annotation task. Third, we
will continue to collaborate with researchers who are developing
software for analyzing the meaning of legal documents. As we
develop our insights into the semantic types that lawyers and
judges find useful in mining arguments from such documents, we
are increasingly aware of the need to bring artificial intelligence to
bear when analyzing the vast and growing corpus of legal
decisions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at
Hofstra University for its support of the Research Laboratory for
Law, Logic and Technology and of this project. Special thanks to
Patricia A. Kasting for her research assistance on this project.

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]

[18]

[19]
[20]
[21]

[22]

REFERENCES
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

Allen, M.P. 2007. Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-2006) and
What They Reveal about the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 40: 483-568. University of Michigan.
Ashley, K.D., and Walker, V.R. 2013a. Toward Constructing Evidence-Based
Legal Arguments Using Legal Decision Documents and Machine Learning. In
Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence
and Law (ICAIL 2013). ACM, New York, NY, 176-180.
Ashley, K.D., and Walker, V.R. 2013b. From Information Retrieval (IR) to
Argument Retrieval (AR) for Legal Cases: Report on a Baseline Study. In
Legal Knowledge and Information Systems, Ashley, K. D., Ed. IOS Press, 2938.
Bansal, A., Bu, Z., Mishra, B., Wang, S., Ashley, K., and Grabmair, M. 2016.
Document Ranking with Citation Information and Oversampling Sentence
Classification in the LUIMA Framework. In Legal Knowledge and
Information Systems (JURIX 2016), Bex, F., and Villata, S., eds. IOS Press,
33-42.

[23]

[24]

[25]

Birner, B. J. 2013. Introduction to Pragmatics. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester,
West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK.
Board of Veterans’ Appeals, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. 2015.
Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2015.
Breeze, R. 2011. Disciplinary values in legal discourse: a corpus study. Ibérica
21(2011): 93-116.
Bunt, H., Prasad, R., and Joshi, A. 2012. First steps towards an ISO standard
for annotating discourse relations. In Proceedings of the Joint ISA-7, SRSL-3,
and I2MRT LREC 2012 Workshop on Semantic Annotation and the
Integration and Interoperability of Multimodal Resources and Tools
(Istanbul, Turkey, May 2012) 60-69.
Francesconi, E., Montemagni, S., Peters, W., and Tiscornia, D. 2010.
Integrating a Bottom-Up and Top-Down Methodology for Building Semantic
Resources for the Multilingual Legal Domain. In Semantic Processing of
Legal Texts, LNAI 6036, 95-121. Springer: Berlin.
Grabmair, M., Ashley, K.D., Chen, R., Sureshkumar, P., Wang, C., Nyberg, E.,
and Walker, V.R. 2015. Introducing LUIMA: An Experiment in Legal
Conceptual Retrieval of Vaccine Injury Decisions Using a UIMA Type
System and Tools. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on
Artificial Intelligence & Law (ICAIL 2015).
Grover, C., Hachey, B., Hughson, I., and Korycinski, C. 2003. Automatic
Summarization of Legal Documents. In Proceedings of the 9th International
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL ’03) 243-251. ACM,
New York.
Kang, J., and Saint-Dizier, P. 2014. A Discourse Grammar for Processing
Arguments in Context. Computational Models of Argument, Parsons, S., Oren,
N., Reed, C., Cerutti, F., Eds. (Proceedings of the 5th Conference on
Computational Models of Argument (COMMA)) IOS Press, 43-50.
Krestel, R., Bergler, S., and Witte, R. 2008. Minding the Source: Automatic
Tagging of Reported Speech in Newspaper Articles. In Proceedings of the
Sixth International Language Resources and Evaluation Conference (LREC
’08) (Marrakech, Morocco, May 28-30, 2008) 2823-2828.
Lippi, M., and Torroni, P. 2016. Argumentation Mining: State of the Art and
Emerging Trends. ACM Trans. Internet Technol. 16, 2, Article 10 (March
2016), 25 pages.
Mochales, R., and Moens, M-F. 2011. Argumentation mining. Artificial
Intelligence and Law 19: 1-22. Springer.
Moshiashwili, V.H. 2015. The Downfall of Auer Deference: Veterans Law at
the Federal Circuit in 2014. American University Law Review 64: 1007-1087.
American University.
Pareti, S. 2011. Annotating Attribution Relations and Their Features. In
Proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Exploiting Semantic Annotations in
Information Retrieval (ESAIR ’11) (Glasgow, Scotland, UK, October 28,
2011). ACM, New York.
Pareti, S., O’Keefe, T., Konstas, I., Curran, J. R., and Koprinska, I. 2013.
Automatically Detecting and Attributing Indirect Quotations. In Proceedings
of the 2013 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language
Processing (Seattle, Washington, October 18-21, 2013) 989-999.
Teufel, S., and Moens, M. 2002. Summarizing scientific articles: experiments
with relevance and rhetorical status. Computational Linguistics, 28(4): 409445.
Walker, V.R. 2014. Representing the use of rule-based presumptions in legal
decision documents. Law, Probability and Risk, 13(3-4): 259-275. Oxford UP.
Walker, V.R., Bagheri, P., and Lauria, A.J. 2015. Argumentation Mining from
Judicial Decisions: The Attribution Problem and the Need for Legal Discourse
Models. Workshop on Automated Detection, Extraction and Analysis of
Semantic Information in Legal Texts (ASAIL-2015).
Walker, V.R., Carie, N., DeWitt, C.C., and Lesh, E. 2011. A framework for
the extraction and modeling of fact-finding reasoning from legal decisions:
lessons from the Vaccine/Injury Project Corpus. Artificial Intelligence and
Law 19: 291-331.
Walker, V.R., Han, J.H., Ni, X., and Yoseda, K. 2017. Semantic Types for
Computational Legal Reasoning: Propositional Connectives and Sentence
Roles in the Veterans’ Claims Dataset. Accepted for Proceedings of the 16th
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL ’17), 10
pages. ACM, New York.
Walker, V.R., Vazirova, K. and Sanford, C. 2014. Annotating Patterns of
Reasoning about Medical Theories of Causation in Vaccine Cases: Toward a
Type System for Arguments. In Proceedings of the First Workshop on
Argumentation Mining (Baltimore, Maryland, June 26, 2014) 1-10. ACL.
Webber, B., and Joshi, A. 2012. Discourse Structure and Computation: Past,
Present and Future. In Proceedings of the ACL-2012 Special Workshop on
Rediscovering 50 Years of Discoveries (Jeju, Republic of Korea, July 10,
2012) 42-54.

